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ACCESS TO MIGRANT LABOR CAMPS:
MARSH v. ALAB.4MA REVISITED
Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co.
574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978)

Constitutional guarantees protecting private property fights' and
those that protect freedom of expression 2 ordinarily will not conflict
with one another. Since the restraints of the first and fourteenth
amendments are addressed solely to the government, 3 the private citi-

zen is not required to open up his property for free speech purposes.
Therefore, while the speaker is entitled to the full range of first amendment freedoms on public property4 he does not enjoy any of those
rights on private property. Yet, when private property is quasi-public
in nature5 the question arises as to whether it should be treated as if it

were public for first amendment purposes.
The company town6 is the classic example of private property that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
[NIor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
U,S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 provides in pertinent part:
[NIor shall any state deprive any person of. . . property, without due process of law.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
The limitations of the first amendment are extended to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
3. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
4. Of course, the phrase "full range" does not mean that one has an absolute right to free
speech. The state may impose reasonable time, manner, and place regulations on the exercise of
first amendment rights. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965) (picketing "in or
near" a court "with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of
justice," constitutionally prohibited).
5. For purposes of analysis, quasi-public property is defined to mean that private property
which is either freely accessible to the public or is operated as a self-contained community for a
significant number of persons.
6. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561-62
(1972), described the company town as follows:
One must have seen such towns to understand that 'functionally' they were no different
from municipalities of comparable size. They developed primarily in the Deep South to
meet economic conditions, especially those which existed following the Civil War. Impoverished States, and especially backward areas thereof, needed an influx of industry
and capital. Corporations attracted to the area by natural resources and abundant labor
were willing to assume the role of local government. Quite literally, towns were built
and oprated by private capital with all of the customary services and utilities normally
afforded by a municipal or state government: there were streets, sidewalks, sewers, public
lighting, police and fire protection, business and residential areas, churches, postal facili-
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has been judicially recognized as an appropriate first amendment forum. One modem day counterpart is the agricultural labor camp. 7 In
Illinois Migrant Council v. CampbellSoup Co. ,8 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether an outsider
seeking to inform labor camp residents of various services and benefits
available to them, enjoyed a first amendment right of access to the
camp. Applying the strict "company town" doctrine9 previously enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, l0 the Seventh Circuit
found that the property in question was not the functional equivalent
of a municipality and hence the campowner's actions were not subject
to the restraints of the first and fourteenth amendments."I The opinion
represents the first time that a state or federal court has subordinated
first amendment rights to the property interests of a migrant labor
camp operator.' 2
This comment will examine the Supreme Court decisions which
led to the emergence of the labor camp cases, assess how other jurisdictions have handled the same problem, examine the facts on which
Campbell Soup is based and analyze the opinion of the Seventh Circuit.' 3 It will be shown that although the Seventh Circuit reached the
correct result on the particular facts of the case, its failure to recognize
and apply the underlying policy of the "company town" doctrine casts
doubt upon the value of the decision as future precedent.

ties, and sometimes schools. In short,. .. [they] had 'all the characteristics of any other
American town.'
7. Agricultural labor camps are similar to the company town because they, too, are often the
functional equivalents of a municipality for their residents. Although the number of municipallike services varies from one camp to the next, the typical camp provides most of the necessities for
daily living from housing, dining and shopping facilities to fire protection, sewage disposal and
recreation facilities. See cases cited at note 45 infra.
8. 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978).
9. The "company town" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946), states that where private property is functionally analogous to a municipality,
it is subject to the first and fourteenth amendments. See the discussion of Marsh in the text
accompanying notes 14-21 infra.
10. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
I1. 574 F.2d at 378.
12. The Third Circuit's opinion in Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v.
Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975), did not unequivocally deny a first amendment right
of access to the camp. Id at 138. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
13. The third issue addressed by the court, whether there was a statutory right of access, will
not be discussed in this case comment. The Seventh Circuit did not find such a right. According
to the court's reading of the statutes and legislative history, there was nothing to indicate that the
purposes of the statutes were to be achieved by affording a right of access to private property. 574
F.2d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1978). The statutes relied upon were 42 U.S.C. § 2861 (1964) and 29
U.S.C. § 801 (1973). Contra, State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 304, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (1971) (purposes
of federal benefit legislation would not be achieved "if the intended beneficiaries could be insulated from efforts to reach them").

NOTES AND COMMENTS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The landmark case sustaining first amendment rights of expression
on private property is Marsh v. Alabama.14 In that case, Mrs. Marsh, a
Jehovah's Witness, attempted to distribute religious literature on the
business block of Chickasaw, Alabama, a town owned entirely by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.' 5 Mrs. Marsh was told that she could
not distribute the literature without a permit and that permission would
not be granted her. When Mrs. Marsh refused to leave, she was arrested and convicted of criminal trespass.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, recognized that "had the
title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation. . . it would have been clear that appellant's conviction must be
reversed."' 6 Thus, the issue before the Court was whether freedom of
the press and religion could be denied to those who lived in or came to
Chickasaw merely because title to the property was vested in a private
corporation.' 7 In holding that first amendment principles applied to
Chickasaw,18 Justice Black devised a legal fiction to satisfy the necessary nexus between the corporation and the state. Since Chickasaw
contained "all the characteristics of any other American town,"' 19 and
was "accessible to and freely used by the public in general, ' 20 the Court
felt justified in treating the property as if it were a typical public fo14. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
15. Justice Black described the town as follows:
The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other
American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's
policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business
places on the business block and the United States uses one of the places as a post office
from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area.
The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be distinuished from the
Gu property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and
according to all indications the residents use the business block as their regular shopping
center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company owned
paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave
the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block
at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto
the business block and upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities avail-

able there. In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by
the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and
shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.
Id at 502-03.
16. Id at
17. Id at
18. Id at
19. Id at
20. Id at

504.
505.
508.
502. See note 15 supra.
503.
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1

In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ,22 the
Supreme Court extended the rationale of Marsh from the setting of a
company town to that of a shopping center. In Logan Valley, union
members set up a picket line in front of the Weis Supermarket, a store
located in the Logan Valley Mall, to protest Weis's employment of a
wholly non-union staff of employees. The picketing was peaceful at all
times and did not interfere with the commercial activity of the store.
Both Weis and the shopping center sued the picketers for criminal trespass and the trial court granted an order permanently enjoining the
23
union from picketing within the center.
The injunction was overturned by the Supreme Court. 24 Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, identified the issue presented in
Marsh to be whether Mrs. Marsh had a first amendment right to pass
out leaflets in the business district of Chickasaw. 25 Upon this assessment of Marsh, Justice Marshall concluded:
[B]ecause the shopping center serves as the community business
block 'and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and
those passing through,' . . . the state may not delegate the power,
through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members
of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
premises in a manner and for a purpose generally
consonant with the
26
use to which the property is actually put.
In a footnote to this holding, the Court expressly reserved judgment on
whether there would have been a first amendment violation if the
speech had been unrelated to the purpose for which the property was
being used. 27
This unrelated speech issue came before the Court four years later
in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,2 where anti-war protesters had been en21. The Court indicated that the state's enforcement of the trespass action, as well as the
state's delegation of power to govern a community of citizens constituted the requisite state action.
In so doing the Court stated: "Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment
on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot
stand." Id at 509. For a critical review of the literature as well as a discussion of the entire state
action concept see Black, Foreward" "StateAction, " Equal Protection,and Calfornia'sProposition
14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).

22. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).

23. Id at 312.
24.

Id at 325.

25. Id at 318 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall reasoned that although Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation's power to prevent trespass extended to the residential areas of the community, "there

was no showing made in [Marsh] that the corporate owner would have sought to prevent the
distribution of leaflets in the residential areas of the town. .. . [T]he specific facts in [Marsh]
involved access to property used for commercial purposes." Id.
26. Id at 319-20 (quoting, in part, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946)).
27. Id. at 320 n.9.
28. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

joined from distributing handbills within a privately owned shopping
mall. 29 Although the Lloyd Center was closely analogous to a municipal business district due to its size, its variety of stores, and its accessibility to the general public, 30 the Lloyd Court refused to sustain first
amendment rights on the property. 31 However, it is not clear from the
32
opinion whether the Court had intended to overrule Logan Valley.
Clearly, the Lloyd Court disapproved of the broad interpretation
of Marsh. Quoting from Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Logan
Valley, the Court stated: "[Tihe basis on which the Marsh decision
rested was that the property involved encompassed an area that for all
practical purposes had been turned into a town; the area had all the
attributes of a town and was exactly like any other town . . . 33
Since the shopping center was not the functional equivalent of a municipality, the Lloyd Court reasoned that Marsh could not be used to
sustain first amendment rights within the Lloyd Center. 34 At this point,
Lloyd appeared to overrule Logan Valley, but the remainder of the
opinion was devoted to distinguishing the facts of the two cases. First,
it was noted that the picketing in Logan Valley was related to the use of
29. Lloyd Center enforced a policy against all distribution of handbills within the building
complex. Id at 555.
30. The center embraced approximately fifty acres and housed nearly sixty stores in an enclosed mall. Lloyd Corporation had pursued several policies to attract shoppers to the center.
Various groups and organizations were permitted to use the auditorium, as were presidential candidates of both parties. The American Legion and the Salvation Army were free to solicit contributions within the malls. 407 U.S. at 555.
31. Id at 569-70.
32. For a discussion of the continuing validity of Logan Valley after Lloyd Corp., see
generally Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment
Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977); Note, The PublicForumfrom Marsh to Lloyd, 24 AM.
U.L. REv. 159 (1974); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. The Demise ofLogan Valley and the Disguiseof

Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973).
33. 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972) (quoting Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 330-31 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)).
34. In comparing the shopping center to the company town, Justice Powell stated: "In effect,
the owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood
in the shoes of the State. In the instant case there is no comparable assumption or exercise of
municipalfunctions orpower." Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
The Court appears to use the words "functions" and "power" synonymously. A distinction
should, however, be drawn between the two for purposes of analyzing whether a private entity's
conduct is subject to the restraints of the first and fourteenth amendments. In Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946), the company was exercising municipal functions by providing streets, sidewalks, a system of sewers and postal services. It also had assumed municipal-like power because
its totality of ownership enabled it to control the flow of information to the community. However, there are situations, such as the migrant labor camp, in which a private entity may not
exercise all thefinctions of a municipality or company town but nonetheless still enjoy the power
to control the flow of communication to those who reside on or use the property. It seems fair to
conclude that under these circumstances the assumption of government-like power alone is sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement of the first and fourteenth amendments. See generally
Berle, Constitutional Limitationson Corporate Activity - Protection ofPersonal Rightsfrom Invasion
of Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).
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the property involved, whereas the handbilling in Lloyd was addressed
to the public in general. 35 Second, the Court pointed out that as a result of the general content of their message, the Lloyd plaintiffs could
have made use of alternative avenues for communicating their message
36
to the intended audience.
In effect, the Lloyd Court had circumvented the state action issue
by adopting a two-pronged test for accommodating the private property rights of a shopping center owner with another's first amendment
rights. Following Lloyd, first amendment rights would prevail if the
communication is related to the use of the property and if alternative
avenues of communication are unavailable. Thus, although Lloyd had
ostensibly limited Marsh to its facts, the opinion did not completely
reject the notion that a privately owned shopping center can be treated
as if it were public for first amendment purposes. However, the first
prong of the Lloyd analysis was to be rejected shortly thereafter in the
most recent shopping center case to be heard by the Supreme Court.
In Hudgens v. NLRB 37 warehouse employees of the Butler Shoe
Company protested contract negotiations by picketing one of the company's retail stores. The store they picketed was located in a privately
owned shopping center. 38 The picketers departed upon being
threatened with arrest for criminal trespass. When the case reached
the United States Supreme Court, the basic question for review was
whether the respective rights and liabilities of the parties should be
governed under the criteria of the National Labor Relations Act alone,
under a first amendment standard, or some combination of the two.
In addressing this issue, the Court first undertook a review of
Marsh and its progeny. Because Lloyd had stated that Marsh was intended to apply only in those situations where the private enterprise
had assumed all the attributes of a state-created municipality, 39 the
Hudgens Court concluded that the Logan Valley doctrine did not survive the Court's decision in Lloyd.4. Even though Marsh had been
neatly limited to its facts, the Court could still have used Lloyd to find a
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

407 U.S. 551, 564 (1972).
Id at 566-67.
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
The Butler warehouse was not located within the shopping center. Id at 509 n.l.
See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall insisted that the two

opinions were reconcilable, stating:
[Lloyd] preserved the holding of Logan Valley, as limited to cases in which (I) the pick-

eting is directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property is
put, and (2) 'no other reasonable opportunities for the picketers to convey their message

to their intended audience [are] available.'
Id at 536 (Marshall, J., dissenting, quoting 407 U.S. at 563).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

first amendment right to picket in a privately owned shopping center.
Instead, the Court held that the first prong of the Lloyd analysis, dealing with the content of the speech, was unconstitutional because it
4
made first amendment rights dependent on the nature of the message. '
However, the Court then relied on Lloyd to support its conclusion,
when Justice Stewart stated:
[If the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment right to enter that shopping center to distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a
First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for
42 the purpose
of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co.
Having determined that the first amendment had no part to play in the
case, the Hudgens Court remanded the case to the court of appeals with
directions to remand to the National Labor Relations Board for consideration pursuant to the statutory criteria of the National Labor Rela43
tions Act alone.
Thus, the history of the "company town" doctrine has gone full
circle to a reaffirmation that Marsh is to be narrowly construed. Yet,
for many years prior to this final enunciation, the "company town"
doctrine had encouraged a struggle between private property interests
and free speech rights. One battleground has been the private migrant
labor camp.
THE MIGRANT LABOR CAMP CASES

Migrant farm workers are among the lowest paid, least educated,
worst fed, and worst housed people in the United States. 44 Either by
41.

Justice Stewart stated: "'[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that government

has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' 424 U.S. at 520 (quoting Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972)). Justice Marshall took exception with the majority on this issue. In his dissenting opinion, he contended that the cases relied on by the majority were inapposite because they involved
the suppression of speech by the state. Justice Marshall agreed with the Court that where the
government acts to suppress speech, it cannot do so on the basis of content alone. But where quasipublic property and first amendment rights conflict, Justice Marshall believed that the latter must
prevail if no effective alternative avenues of communication exist. His theory is that to determine
if any alternatives exist, we must, in part, examine the content of the speech involved. Thus, in
Logan Valley, Justice Marshall found it especially significant that the speech involved the picketing of a single store located within the shopping center. See also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (employer cannot prohibit union from distributing literature to
employees on the premises when other channels of communication are inadequate) (dicta).
42. 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
43. Id at 523.
44. duFresne & McDonnell, The MigrantLabor Camps- Enclaves of Isolation in Our Midst,

40 FoRDAmu L. REv. 279, 280 (1971). The literature on the plight of the migrant workers is
extensive. See generally SUBCOMM. ON MIGRANT LABOR OE.THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR &
PUBLIC WELFARE, THE MIGRATORY FARM LABOR PROBLEtIN THE U.S., S. REP. No. 83, 91st
Cong. 1st Sess. (1970); Sherman& Levy, Free Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 57 A.B.A.J. 434

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

the terms of their employment or as a result of their social and financial
status, migrant farm workers ordinarily live in a labor camp during the
harvest. These camps are often encircled by barbed wire fences and
"No Trespassing" signs to keep visitors away. In the typical case, the
camp operator, in the name of property rights, denies a union organizer
or representative of a public interest organization the right to communicate with the migrant workers on the camp premises.
In cases where those denied entry have sued alleging a violation of

their first and fourteenth amendment rights, the overwhelming majority of the courts have ruled in favor of a right of access, 4 5 but have
offered a variety of rationales for their decisions. For purposes of
analysis, these rationales will be labeled the "company town" test, the

landlord/tenant rationale and the balancing approach.
The "Company Town" Test
Prior to Campbell Soup, two other cases had been decided at the
federal appellate level.46 In Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp.,47 representatives for the United Farm Workers Union attempted to enter a

privately owned sugar plantation for union related purposes.48 The
company invoked a Florida trespass statute,4 9 and the UFW people
were arrested for criminal trespass.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the imposition of the trespass statute was the equivalent of state action and therefore the union's
first amendment rights had been abridged. The court reasoned that the
labor camp was closely analogous to the traditional company town

since "[i]t was a self-contained community in which municipal services
were afforded for a thousand migrants . . . from fire protection and
(1971); Chase, The Migrant Farm Worker in Colorado - The Life and the Law, 40 U. COLO. L.
REV. 45 (1967).
45. See Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Mid-Hudson Legal
Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250
(D. Conn. 1974); UFW v. Mel Finerman Co., 364 F. Supp. 326 (D. Col. 1973); Franceschina v.
Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich.
1971); State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974);
People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1971); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d
369 (1971). But see Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co.,
518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment right of access denied because plaintiffs failed to
prove that alternative avenues of communication were not available).
46. See Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d
130 (3d Cir. 1975); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. The United Farm Workers Union will hereinafter be referred to as the UFW. The UFW
representatives were attempting to substantiate reports that the company had been illegally employing migrant canecutters as field equipment operators. They also wanted to present the workers
with information about the union's religious organizations. Id at 77.
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (1973) (repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 74-383, § 66).

-
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postal services to sewage, and garbage disposal, and electric services. 50
Having satisfied the threshold question of state action, the Fifth
Circuit tested the reasonableness of the Talisman Corporation's restraints through use of a Lloyd-like balancing scheme. Since no effective alternatives were available to the plaintiffs, 5' the company was
required to "accommodate its property rights to the extent necessary to
allow the free flow of ideas and information between the plaintiffs and
'52
the migrants.
The Lloyd analysis was also applied in another pre-Hudgens decision, albeit for a different purpose, by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Asociacion de Trabajadoresde Puerto Rico v. Green
Giant Co. 53 Because the Green Giant camp was not open to the gen-

eral public, the Third Circuit concluded that the company "need not
permit automatic and wholesale entry by all who assert First Amend-

ment rights." 54 Yet, since the camp was akin to a company town in
several respects, the court reasoned that if the plaintiffs were to satisfy
the two-pronged Lloyd analysis, their first amendment rights would

prevail over Green Giant's property interests. 55 Ultimately, a first
amendment right of access was denied because the plaintiffs had failed

to prove the unavailability of reasonable alternatives for contacting the
56
migrants.
Finally, in a post-Hudgens case, a federal district court used the

"company town" test to sustain first amendment rights within a migrant labor camp. In Mid-Hudson LegalServices, Inc. v. G & U, Inc. ,57
a legal services corporation sought to enjoin a corporate farm from de50. 478 F.2d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 1973). The court also distinguished the shopping center cases
on the basis of the number of municipal-like services performed by the labor camp. The lack of
privately supplied postal services and garbage collections in the typical shopping center were specifically pointed out. Id.
51. Due to the lack of their own transportation, a language barrier and limited financial
resources, the Jamaican workers were only able to leave the camp every other Saturday. The
court found the bi-weekly excursions to be insufficiently frequent for discussions with the workers.
Id

52. Id at 83. It was noted that the owner-employer could establish reasonable regulations so
that visitors would not interfere with daily business operations.
53. 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975). As part of an organizing campaign, labor union officials
sought access to Green Giant's asparagus farm which housed 900 Puerto Rican laborers. When
threatened with prosecution for criminal trespass, the labor union initiated a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief to assure a guaranteed right of access. Id at 133.
54. Id at 138.
55. Id

56. Id However, the court acknowledged that since the facts in the case were not fully developed, it was impossible to say whether plaintiffs might later prove a first amendment right of
access. Id at 140 n.35. For a critical review of the Third Circuit's opinion in Green Giant see
Comment, The BillofRights, State Action, and Private Migrant Labor Camps, 1976 UTAH L. REV.

214.
57. 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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nying it access to the farm for the purpose of informing the workers of
their rights. The district court held that since the camp contained the
"hallmarks of a 'company town,' "plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable
58
access to the property.
The courts that have used the "company town" test have done so
because in their estimation the particular labor camp was more analogous to the company town than not. But, as noted in the Green Giant
opinion, the company town in Marsh was open to the general public.
Since free ingress and egress is a characteristic foreign to most labor
camps, the "company town" test is not without its shortcomings.
The Landlord/TenantRationale
A second line of cases illustrates the use of a landlord/tenant rationale to assure a right of access to migrant labor camps. 59 The basic
premise underlying this rationale is a fundamental tenet of real property law: a tenant has the right to receive visitors at his own discretion.6° In most instances, however, the migrants do not give
consideration for their housing. Therefore, they usually cannot be
classified as tenants. 6 ' However, as demonstrated in the opinions of
two federal district courts, this problem is easily circumvented. In Folgueras v. Hassle,62 the court found the requisite consideration by reasoning that one justification for the migrant's extremely low wages was
the company's provision of free housing. 63 And, in Franceschina v.
Morgan," the concept of consideration was even more liberally construed. It was found that the free rent lured the migrants to the camp
65
and the migrants in turn ensured the flow of crops to the canneries.

58. Id at 62. The court did not explain what it meant by "hallmarks" and no description of

the camp appears in the opinion.
59. See Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331
F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230 (1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
60. See Gordon County Broadcasting Co. v. Chitwood, 211 Ga. 544, 87 S.E.2d 78 (1955);
Konick v. Champneys, 108 Wash. 35, 183 P. 75 (1919) (also stressed the corollary principle that
the landlord has no right to prohibit a tenant's visitors from coming on the premises).
61. For a critical analysis of the landlord/tenant rationale, see Note, FirstAmendment andthe
Problem ofAccess to Migrant Labor Camps after Lloyd Corp. Y Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 560,

563 (1976).
62. 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
63. Id at 624.
64. 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
65. Id at 838.
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The BalancingApproach
As the above discussion indicates, the landlord/tenant rationale
enables the court to decide the access issue without having to encounter
the difficulties of locating the state action that is inherent in the "company town" test. Another way the courts have circumvented the state
action problem is through an ad hoc balancing of the camp operator's
property interests on the one hand and the free speech rights of the
migrant workers on the other. This typically involves assessing both
the right of the camp operator to keep his land free from unwarranted
intrusions and his interest in assuring the stability of his business operations, and juxtaposing these interests against those of the migrant
worker to have access to information and, in general, to lead a dignified
life. Each court that has employed a balancing scheme has concluded
that the campowner's property rights do not include a license to suspend the migrant residents' constitutional right to be properly informed. 66 The rationale of this conclusion was stated best by the New
67
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Shack:
Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of
persons the owner permits to come upon the premises. Their wellbeing must remain the paramount concern of a system of law. Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their
strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants the power to
contract68away what is deemed essential to their health, welfare, or
dignity.
Although the Shack court had struck a balance in favor of a right of
access to the camp, the court did not intend by its holding to open the
camp to all who might wish to enter. Rather, the court stated: "[W]e

do not say, for example, that solicitors or peddlers of all kinds may
enter on their own; . . . the employer may regulate their entry or bar
them, at least if the employer's purpose is not to gain a commercial
advantage for himself or if the regulation does not deprive the migrant
' 69
workers of practical access to things he needs."
Although at first glance the balancing approach appears to be very
compelling because it encourages judgments founded upon general
principles of equity and fairness, it does not create firm guidelines by
which other courts may assess the respective rights of the parties in66. See Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); UFW v. Mel Finerman Co.,
364 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1973); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); State
v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971); People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1971).
67. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
68. Id at 303, 277 A.2d at 372.
69. Id at 308, 277 A.2d at 374.
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volved. Therefore, it must be recognized that the fairness inherent in
the balancing approach is a weakness as well as a strength.
ILLINOIS MIGRANT COUNCIL V CAMPBELL SOUP CO.

The property involved in Campbell Soup is a 201 acre mushroom

farm known as Prince Crossing, Illinois.70 The property consists of a
residential area that houses eighty-eight Spanish-speaking migrant
workers. 7 l This area includes a store,7 2 dining hall, and multi-purpose
73
building. The company provides fire extinguishers and a hydrant,
garbage and sewage disposal and enforces a disciplinary code on the

property. 74 Police protection is provided by the DuPage County Sheriff's Office.
76
The Illinois Migrant Council75 is a not-for-profit corporation
that provides educational, 77 health78 and vocational7 9 services to mi-

grant and seasonal workers in Illinois. Roy Villareal, the regional director of the IMC office in Joliet, Illinois, attempted to visit the
residents of Prince Crossing on the company property to inform them
of the various state, federal and IMC services and benefits available to
them. The company denied Villareal access to the farm.
IMC and Villareal brought suit in the United States District Court,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive and actual dam70. Prince Crossing is approximately one mile from the nearest town, West Chicago, Illinois.
The farm is entirely surrounded by other private lands. It is bisected by a single rural county
road; company owned roads lead from the county road to the farming and residential areas of the
community. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at
7.
71. The residents of Prince Crossing are predominantly Mexican citizens who have permanent resident status in the United States. No resident has completed more than nine years of
education and fifty percent have six years or less of schooling. The migrant workers are, for the
most part, unskilled agricultural laborers. They work nine hours per day, Monday through Saturday. Their incomes vary but the available data indicate that approximately twenty percent
earn less than five thousand dollars annually. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11-12.
72. The store only carries surplus Campbell canned goods. The residents must shop in the
neighboring towns for daily necessities. 574 F.2d at 378.
73. Affidavits of the residents indicated, however, that if a fire occurred they would call the
West Chicago Fire Department. Id at 377.
74. The code only applies to company employees and thus does not apply to forty percent of
Prince Crossing's residents. Sanctions for violations of the code are work related. Id
75. Hereinafter referred to as IMC.
76. IMC receives federal funding pursuant to the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2701 - 2996 (1964) and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801 - 992
(1973).
77. IMC's programs include adult education, consumer educauon ana hlgh school
equivalency courses. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5-6.
78. IMC counsels farmworkers on preventive health care and occupational diseases. Brief

for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6.
79. Upon completion of the educational vocational training programs, IMC places the migrant workers in better paying skilled employment positions. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5.
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ages.8 0 The gravamen of IMC's complaint was that by refusing to per-

mit an IMC representative to enter Prince Crossing, the Campbell
Soup Company had violated IMC's rights and the rights of the Prince
Crossing residents as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. 8 ' The company moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim. In sustaining the motion, the district court found that the
failure of the plaintiffs to specifically allege that the company provided
police protection, sewage disposal and postal and shopping facilities
constituted an implicit admission that the company did not maintain
such services. 82 Accordingly, the court held that Prince Crossing did
not possess sufficient public characteristics to satisfy the state action
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 198383 and the first and fourteenth amend84
ments.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court. Reviewing the allegations of the complaint "in the light most favorable to [IMC]," 85 the

Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had stated facts from
which it could be inferred that Prince Crossing was a company town. 86
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit stressed that size alone was not the
central concern in applying the "company town" doctrine. The court
noted:

80. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 74 C 2619 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (unpublished opinion).
81. Id
82. Id
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
84. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 74 C 2619 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (unpublished opinion).
85. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
86. The specific language of the court was as follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the Company operated a residential community for
150.persons - providing them with the basic facilities needed, including a work place,
residences, a store, a cafeteria and a recreational building. The complaint further alleged that the Company enforced a no-trespass policy, from which it would be quite
reasonable to infer that the Company had some means of enforcing its no-trespass rules.
It would further seem reasonable to infer that a community of 150 persons, located some
miles from any other town, must have some means of protecting itself from crime and
fire, and must have some means of disposing of its sewage. In sum, in our view, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged sufficient facts upon which it could be concluded that the
Campbell Soup Company's town of Prince Crossing was a company town within the
meaning of Marsh v. Alabama, and accordingly when the defendant Company acted, it
did so under color of state law.
519 F.2d at 395.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

The town of Chickasaw was large, Prince Crossing is small, but we
think size alone is not the important criterion by which to evaluate
whether the town has sufficient public residential characteristics as to
constitute state action. Ratherthe question is whether PrinceCrossing
87
serves as afunctional equivalent of a municpalityfor its residents.
The case was remanded to the district court to permit IMC to prove
that the camp was a company town within the meaning of Marsh, thus
satisfying the state action requirement of section 1983 and the first and
fourteenth amendments.
On remand, the district court found that the Campbell Soup Company had provided enough municipal-like services to satisfy the "company town" test as defined in Marsh.8 8 Thus, the court concluded that
when the defendant acted to prevent IMC from exercising its free
speech rights within the farm, it had done so "under color of state
law." 9 Again, it was emphasized "that a community [need not] have
all of the attributes of a state created municipality" to satisfy the "company town" test.9° An order permanently enjoining the company from
denying IMC access to the farm was issued.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, this injunction was vacated.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudgens v.
NLRB, 9 1 which had been decided subsequent to the time the Seventh
Circuit first reviewed the Campbell Soup case, the Seventh Circuit
chose to interpret Marsh very narrowly. The court compared Prince
Crossing to Chickasaw, Alabama, the town in Marsh, and concluded
that since fire and police protection were not provided by the company,
and because nothing comparable to a business district existed within
the camp, 92 Prince Crossing was not the functional equivalent of a
87. Id at 394 (emphasis added).
88. The court reasoned as follows:
The community at its center is at least a mile away from the nearest town. The company
provides a rudimentary system of fire protection through fire extinguishers, a central fire
hydrant, and water hose. It provides residents with sewage disposal; and it furnishes
water from a company owned well. Prince Crossing has outside fighting, a central heat-

ing plant, an athletic field, recreational facilities, electricity, garbage collection, snow
removal, and the common amenities found in any municipality. More important is the
fact that the company enforces a disciplinary code in Prince Crossing, and metes out
penalties through a system it administers. From these uncontested facts, there can be
only one conclusion: that Prince Crossing is a company town within the meaning of

Marsh v. Alabama.
438 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D. Ml1.1977).
89. Id at 226.
90. Id (emphasis added).
91. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra for a discussion of
Hudgens.
92. In evaluating Prince Crossing under the "company town" doctrine, the Seventh Circuit

stated: "In our analysis we compare Prince Crossing's shopping district to that of a municipality of
similar size, and not to that of the town in Marsh." 574 F.2d at 377.
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company town.9 3
IMC argued in the alternative that in those instances where the
property does not satisfy the "company town" test, but is nonetheless
quasi-public, 94 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner95 guarantees a constitutional
right of access if the speech is related to the use of the property and if
no alternative avenues for communication exist. The Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument on the belief that the Supreme Court in Hudgens
96
had declared the first prong of the Lloyd analysis unconstitutional.
ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

As the above recital discloses, the history of Campbell Soup has
been a history of shifting positions on the part of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The major distinction between the first and second Seventh Circuit opinions is that in the former
the court compared Prince Crossing to a municipality of comparable
size whereas in the latter the court employed the prototype of a
company town as its measuring stick.9 7 Thus, the Seventh Circuit, in
its most recent review of Campbell Soup, digressed into a quantitative
evaluation of the "company town" doctrine and ignored the policy
that is the strength of the Marsh opinion.
Although in Marsh the Supreme Court had described at length the
bevy of municipal-like functions the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation
was performing, 98 the specific number of those functions was only important to the extent that they conferred on Gulf the capacity to materially affect the first amendment rights of those in the community. 99 In
other words, because the corporation owned all the "public" places traditionally associated with exercise of expressive rights, the corporation
had the capacity to cut off the flow of information to the town's residents. Thus, Justice Black concluded that "[t]he managers appointed by
the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees." 100

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id at 378.
For the definition of "quasi-public" property, see note 5 supra.
407 U.S. 551(1972). See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra for a discussion of Lloyd.
574 F.2d at 378.

97. Curiously, the court continued to maintain that the shopping district of Prince Crossing
should be juxtaposed with one in a municipality of comparable size to Prince Crossing. 574 F.2d
at 377.
98. See note 15 supra.
99. It is for this reason that Justice Black wrote: "[Whether a corporation or a municipality

owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of
the community in such manner that the channels of communication remainfree." 326 U.S. 501, 507
(1946). See also Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment
Adjudication,61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977); Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 122 (1972); Comment, 7 GA.
L. REV. 177 (1972).
100. 326 U.S. at 509.
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In failing to appreciate the interrelationship between privately
supplied municipal services and first amendment expressive rights, the
Seventh Circuit's analysis resulted in a formalistic rather than a substantive interpretation of the "company town" doctrine. By comparing
Prince Crossing to Chickasaw, the court placed primary emphasis on
the number of municipal-like services the company was providing, and
in so doing, effectively held that no small migrant labor camp can be
subject to the principles of the first and fourteenth amendments. Following Campbell Soup, if a labor camp provides a broad range of municipal-like services and yet does not maintain the functional
equivalent of a municipal fire and police department, it cannot be
treated as an appropriate first amendment forum. The effect of this
formalistic interpretation of Marsh might very well be a worsening in
the already impoverished living conditions of the migrant farmworker.
As long as a first amendment right of access is dependent upon the
number of municipal-like services a camp contains, it will be to the
advantage of the owners of the larger camps to provide fewer services
to the migrant worker.
Curiously, the Seventh Circuit felt constrained by Hudgens to apply this narrow interpretation of Marsh. Although the Hudgens Court
indicated its approval of limiting Marsh to its facts,10 ' the Seventh Circuit could have easily distinguished Hudgens on the basis of the differing first amendment consequences a shopping center and migrant labor
camp portend for those who use the properties. In the case of the former, since those who use a shopping center do not reside there, the
center's proprietor is ordinarily not in a position to cut off their access
to information. In contrast, the migrant labor camp, like the company
town, serves as a residential community where dozens if not hundreds
of people spend their working and leisure time. Accordingly, the
campowner is more likely to have the capacity to control the flow of
information to the camp residents than is his shopping center counterpart.102
101. See 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976).
102. In his dissenting opinion in the Lloyd case, Justice Marshall suggested that the shopping

center owner does indeed have the ability to control the channels of communication. Justice
Marshall stated:
the themselves
major newspahave
easy the
access
television,
For
persons
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express
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onlytoway
media,
mass
formsdoofnot
other who
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broad range of citizens on issues of general public concern is to picket, or to handbill, or
to utilize other free or relatively inexpensive means of communication. The only hope
that these people have to be able to communicate effectively is to be permitted to speak
in those areas m which most of their fellow citizens can be found. One such area is the
business district of a city or town or its functional equivalent.
407 U.S. 551, 581 (1972) (Marshall J., dissenting).
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The Marsh "company town" holding should provide the test for
determining whether first amendment rights can be sustained within a
private migrant labor camp. However, the inquiry should be into the
nature of the camp proprietor's ownership rather than the number of
municipal-like services he performs. 0 3 It is suggested that this focus
represents a substantive rather than a formalistic reading of Marsh and
provides a more equitable approach to the migrant labor camp cases
than does the strict "company town" evaluation.
In analyzing the nature of a camp proprietor's ownership, the focal
point should be the availability of alternative avenues of communication.104 Thus, if the campowner does not control all the avenues for
effective communication with the workers, he would be entitled to deny
outsiders a right of access to the farm. It should be noted that this conclusion will not be unduly harsh because it presumes that the camp
residents have other reasonable means by which they can receive information. On the other hand, if the campowner has the ability to effectively control the flow of information to the workers, then he possesses
government-like power analogous to that of the corporation in Marsh
and consequently should not be permitted to deny outsiders a right to
enter the property. This, too, is a reasonable result because if the government is constitutionally prohibited from realizing its inherent power
to cut off the flow of information to its citizens, a private entity that has
a similar capacity should likewise be denied the right to exercise this
power. 105
Applying this suggested test to the facts in Campbell Soup, it is
seen that in spite of the Seventh Circuit's formalistic interpretation of
Marsh, the court did reach the correct result. Because the residents of
Prince Crossing found it necessary to frequent the West Chicago Community for a variety of needs and were, in fact, an integral part of that
community, IMC representatives could have conveyed their information to the workers off the premises and with relatively little inconve-

103. See also Comment, The Bill ofRights, State Action, and Privae Migrant Labor Camps,

1976

UTAH

L. REv. 214. For a critical analysis of other theories of state action that might be

appropriate to the labor camp cases see Spriggs, Access of Visitors to Labor Camps on Privately
Owned Property, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 295 (1969).
104. This is, of course, the second prong of the Lloyd analysis. It should be noted that this
part of the Lloyd opinion was left unscathed by the Hudgens decision. In Hudgens the Supreme
Court only addressed its analysis to an evaluation of the related-to-the-use test--the first prong in
Lloyd See 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
105. See note 34 supra. Of course, once it is determined that the property is an appropriate
first amendment forum, the property owner should still be allowed to impose reasonable regulations on those seeking to use his property for expressive purposes.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

nience. I° 6 Therefore, a substantive reading of Marsh reveals that
reasonable alternative avenues of communication were available to
IMC and consequently yields the same conclusion as the one reached
by the Seventh Circuit: that when the company acted, it did not do so
under color of state law. Hence there was no abridgement of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

In Campbell Soup, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit failed to apply the substance or policy of the Marsh "company town" holding. Although the Supreme Court in Hudgens
rejected an extension of Marsh, the Seventh Circuit could have distinguished Hudgens because the proprietor of a migrant labor camp,
unlike one of a shopping mall, often has the ability to cut off the flow of

information to those who use his property. When this happens, the
policy of Marsh dictates that the property is an appropriate first
amendment forum. By focusing entirely on the factual characteristics
of Marsh, the Seventh Circuit's approach could very well delegate to

many migrant labor camp operators the power to cut off the flow of
information to people in their homes, a severe encroachment upon first

amendment rights.
FREDERICK KAPLAN

106. See Brief for Defendant - Appellant at 29, Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup
Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978). In this brief Campbell Soup stated:
The sworn statements of Prince Crossing residents, local educators, the Mayor of West
Chicago, and a leader of the West Chicago Spanish-speaking community all confirm that
the municipality to which Prince Crossing residents belong and into which such residents
are fully integrated is the greater West Chicago community. Prince Crossing residents
actively participate in West Chicago's educational, social, civic, sports and business life.
They read newspapers, listen to radio and television, read posters, flyers and other forms
of written advertisements directed to them from the geater West Chicago community, as
well as from other communities within the Metropolitan Chicago Area. Indeed, Prince
Crossing residents rely on the greater West Chicago community for such crucial municiSse rvices as medical treatment, education, crime prevention, and fire protection.
ce Crossing residents similarly rely on the greater West Chicago community for
food, clothing, entertainment, and religion.

